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Abstract
We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players
have present-biased (so-called β-δ) preferences. We give a two-step procedure
to characterize Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs: compute the continuation
payoff set using recursive techniques, and then use this set to characterize the
equilibrium payoff set U (β, δ). While Strotz-Pollak equilibrium and subgame
perfection differ here, the generated paths and payoffs nonetheless coincide.
We then explore the cost of the present-time bias. Fixing the total present
value of 1 util flow, lower β or higher δ shrinks the payoff set. Surprisingly,
unless the minimax outcome is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the
equilibrium payoff set U (β, δ) is not separately monotonic in β or δ. While
U (β, δ) is contained in payoff set of a standard repeated game with smaller
discount factor, the present-time bias precludes any lower bound on U (β, δ)
that would easily generalize the β = 1 folk-theorem.
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Introduction

1

In repeated decision-making, an agent with non-exponential time preferences must
face the problem of dynamic inconsistency, namely: how should he currently behave
if he knows that his future behavior might well undo his best laid current plans. If
he can not precommit his future behavior, the best he can do, according to Strotz
(1955–56), is to resign himself to the intertemporal conflict and choose “the best
plan among those he will actually follow.” That is, after any history of choices,
the agent takes an action that maximizes his utility given his utility maximizing
strategies of the future. Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, as formalized by Peleg and Yaari
(1973), is then a strategy that is immune to one shot deviations, taking into account
the intertemporal conflict. It has since also become conventional to interpret this as
a subgame perfect equilibrium amongst temporally distinct selves: “a specification
of a strategy for each player such that agent t0 s choice after any history of play is
optimal given all other agents’ strategies” (Kocherlakota, 1996).
The literature on such present-biased (or ‘hyperbolic’) discounting has so far been
focused largely on decision makers acting either in isolation or in perfectly competitive environments. Examples include the savings consumption decision (Laibson,
1997, Rabin and ODonoghue 1999), the smoking decision (Gruber and Koszegi,
2001), the labor supply decision (Della Vigna and Paserman, 2003), and optimal
taxation (Krusell, et al. 2002). This paper instead analyzes the strategic behavior
of many hyperbolic discounters interacting in a non-cooperative game.
We study infinitely repeated games with observable actions, where players have
β-δ preferences — i.e. with the quasi-geometric discount sequence 1, βδ, βδ 2 , . . .. We
first provide a two-step procedure to characterize the set of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium
payoffs: First, a recursive methodology adapted from Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti, 1986,
1990 (hereafter, APS) characterizes the set of continuation payoffs, using different
weights on current versus future payoffs than are found in the incentive constraints.
From this recursive set, the equilibrium payoffs are then computed. To ensure convex
sets of payoffs, we then add a public randomization device.
Subgame perfection is the natural touchstone of credibility in repeated games.1
In a strategic setting, the Strotz-Pollak equilibrium concept coincides under geometric discounting with the stronger notion of subgame perfection; however, the crucial
one-shot deviation principle fails with time-inconsistency, so that these concepts
1

We actually call it “sincere” subgame perfection, because a player at the beginning of the subgame analyzes the optimality of the strategy over the infinite horizon with his current preferences.
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differ. Nevertheless, we show that the generated action paths and thereby payoffs
nonetheless coincide. Unlike the single-agent case, it is therefore always possible
to support a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium so that different “incarnations” of a player
agree on the optimality of a strategy, given the other players’ strategies: There is
ultimately no intertemporal conflict among multiple selves.
A key result then separates this from geometric discounting: continuation payoffs
are now a possibly proper subset of equilibrium payoffs. This wedge drives some
interesting comparative statics, and allows us to calibrate the cost of the presenttime bias in this strategic setting. We show that changing β < 1 matters more than
shifts in the long-term discount factor δ < 1. For suppose that an eternal one util
flow discounted by the constant factor ∆ < δ has the same total present value as
it does with β-δ preferences. Fixing ∆, the continuation and equilibrium payoff set
shrinks iff β falls and δ rises — despite the greater weight δ on continuation payoffs
in the recursion. This comparative static therefore cannot be proven by adapting
the APS proof, and we provide an indirect argument by separation methods instead.
Surprisingly, the equilibrium payoff set need not be separately monotonic in β or
δ. We show this by example, exploiting the non-coincidence of the worst equilibrium
and continuation payoffs. We then rescue the “standard” APS payoff monotonicity
for when the minimax point is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, as is true, eg.,
with the Prisoner’s Dilemma. In such games, the worst equilibrium and continuation
payoffs clearly coincide, and the payoff sets expand as δ or β separately increase.
We finally try to understand the equilibrium payoff set by sandwiching it between those of standard repeated games with different discount factors. By a simple
corollary of our comparative static, we bound above it using the discount factor
∆. But to really understand how much the present bias hurts payoffs, we seek a
lower bound. For instance, might the payoff set implode with the present bias? The
factor βδ clearly discounts all future payoffs less than the β-δ discounter does, and
is a strong candidate for a lower bound. While this works in a symmetric class of
prisoner’s dilemma games, we show that it generally fails. An example proves that
the present-time bias precludes any nontrivial lower bound set that could plausibly
allow us to deduce a folk theorem from the standard one with geometric discounting.
The next section outlines the model and solution concepts. Section 3 develops
the recursive characterization results, and relates Strotz-Pollak and subgame perfect
equilibrium. We explore the effects of the present bias on the payoffs in Section 4.

2

2

The Model

We analyze infinitely repeated games with observable actions. The only departure
from the standard such model is that we assume quasi-geometric (or β-δ) discounting. Preferences of this kind were first studied in decision theory by Phelps and
Pollak (1968), and are sometimes called quasi-hyperbolic (e.g., see Laibson, 1996).
Denote the stage game by G = (N, (Ai )i∈N , (πi )i∈N ), where N = {1, . . . , n} is
a finite set of players, Ai = {1, . . . , Ii } is player i’s finite set of actions, and πi is
player i’s payoff function from A = × Ai to the real line R. We shall assume that
i∈N

the stage game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Let V denote the set of
feasible and weakly individually rational payoffs of G.
The repeated game G∞ (β, δ) begins at stage 0, with the null history h0 = ∅.
At the beginning of stage k, each player observes the history hk of actions chosen
at all previous stages. If the action profile ak = (ak1 , . . . , akn ) is chosen at stage
k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, then player i’s stage-t (t = 0, 1, . . .) discounted total payoff is:
t

πi (a ) + β

∞
X

δ k πi (at+k ),

(1)

k=1

where β and δ (both between 0 and 1) are discount factors common to all players.
The parameter β captures a player’s bias for the present, for it implies that she
assigns more relative weight to the stage-k payoff at stage k than she did at any
stage prior to stage k. This present bias is the source of dynamic inconsistency in
the model, since current and past preferences over ‘today’ versus ‘tomorrow’ differ.
Given discount factors β and δ, define the effective discount factor ∆(β, δ) by:
1+βδ+βδ 2 +· · · = 1+∆(β, δ)+∆(β, δ)2 +· · · =

1
βδ
⇒ ∆(β, δ) =
1 − ∆(β, δ)
1 − δ + βδ

Critical throughout this paper is that ∆(β, δ) < δ. Player i’s stage-t discounted
average payoff equals his stage-t discounted payoff scaled by (1 − ∆(β, δ)).
Let Ak denote the k-fold Cartesian product of A, and H k the set of all stage-k
action histories. Obviously, H k = Ak . A pure strategy for player i is a map fi from
∞

H = ∪ H k to Ai . Since we restrict attention to pure strategies (see Abreu (1988)),
k=0

we henceforth and throughout the paper drop the qualifier “pure”.
|h

Denote by fi player i0 s strategy induced by fi in the subgame after history
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h ∈ H. By definition,
|h

fi (h0 ) = fi ({h, h0 })
for all i ∈ N, all ai ∈ Ai , and all conjoined histories {h, h0 } ∈ H, listing all actions
|h

|h

in h followed by those in h0 . As usual, we write f |h = (f1 , . . . , fn ).
Given a strategy profile f = (f1 , . . . , fn ) and a history h ∈ H, the discounted
total payoff (1) of player i can be rewritten in discounted average form:
ui (f |h | β, δ) = (1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (f (h)) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f |{h,f (h)} | δ),
where ci (f |{h,f (h)} | δ)) is his naturally defined continuation payoff.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our solution concept is a straightforward extension of that found in the decision-theoretic literature on present-biased preferences to the infinitely repeated game setting under analysis.
Definition: A strategy profile f = (f1 , . . . , fn ) is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium if, for
any history h ∈ H, player i ∈ N , and action ai ∈ Ai \{fi (h)},
(1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (f (h)) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f |{h,f (h)} | δ)
0

≥ (1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (a0i , f−i (h)) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f |{h,(ai ,f−i (h))} | δ)
Hence, a strategy profile is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium if there are no profitable
one-stage deviations. Intuitively, each player then finds it optimal, given his preferences at any stage, to carry out the actions his strategy specified for that stage.
Conditional on the players choosing their actions according to f , the stage-(k−1)
continuation payoff can be represented along the equilibrium path as follows:
k

k ,f (hk )}

ci (f |h | δ) = (1 − δ)πi (f (hk )) + δci (f |{h

| δ).

As we later see, the recursive structure of the continuation payoffs allows us to adapt
the APS technique to compute the Strotz-Pollak equilibrium continuation payoff set.
For the game G∞ (β, δ), let ΣSP (β, δ) denote the set of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium
strategy profiles, U (β, δ) the set of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs, and C (β, δ)
the set of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium continuation payoffs. Thus,
U (β, δ) =

[

u(f | β, δ)

and

f ∈ΣSP (β,δ)

C(β, δ) =

[

c(f | δ),

f ∈ΣSP (β,δ)

where u(f |β, δ) = (u1 (f |β, δ), . . . , un (f |β, δ)) and c(f |δ) = (c1 (f |δ), . . . , cn (f |δ)).
4
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Characterization Results

3.1

The Recursive Structure and Construction of U (β, δ)

We now provide a constructive characterization of the set of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoffs, adapting the method of APS. Our two-step procedure can be succinctly
explained as follows. First, we exploit the recursive structure of continuation payoffs
and characterize the set C(β, δ) as the largest fixed point of an operator. Next, we
construct the set U (β, δ) using continuation payoffs drawn from C(β, δ).
As in APS, fix a discount factor ∆ ∈ (0, 1) and payoff set W ⊂ Rn . Call a
pair (a, κ), where a ∈ A and κ is a function from A to continuation values W ,
∆-admissible w.r.t. W if, for all players i ∈ N , and actions (ai , a−i ) ∈ A and
a0i ∈ Ai \{ai },
(1 − ∆)πi (ai , a−i ) + ∆κi (ai , a−i ) ≥ (1 − ∆)πi (a0i , a−i ) + ∆κi (a0i , a−i ).
Let us define the following self-generating operator
B(W | β, δ) = {v ∈ V : v = (1−δ)π(a)+δκ(a) | (a, κ) is ∆(β, δ)-admissible w.r.t. W }
A set W ⊂ V is called self-generating if W ⊂ B(W | β, δ). For standard
repeated games with β = 1, APS has shown that the self-generating sets are of
interest precisely because they are candidate equilibrium payoff sets. Here, we focus
on them for their recursive character. Just like the decision-theoretic setting (see
Phelps and Pollak (1968)), but quite unlike in APS, the recursive structure applies
only to the set of equilibrium continuation payoffs.
Theorem 1 (Characterization) Fix 0 < β, δ < 1.
(a) If W ⊂ Rn is self-generating, then C(W | β, δ) ⊂ C(β, δ).
(b) Factorization: C(β, δ) is the largest fixed point of the operator B(· | β, δ) :
C(β, δ) = {v = (1 − δ)π(a) + δκ(a) ∈ V | (a, κ) is ∆(β, δ)-admissible w.r.t. C(β, δ)}
Further, given C(β, δ), the equilibrium payoff set U (β, δ) ⊂ Rn satisfies:
U (β, δ) = {v ∈ V :

v = (1 − ∆(β, δ))π(a) + ∆(β, δ)κ(a)
and (a, κ) is ∆(β, δ)-admissible w.r.t. C(β, δ)}.
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(c) The sets C(β, δ) and U (β, δ) are compact.
The proof of (a) is similar to Theorem 1 of APS; the proof of (c) is standard.
For (b), consider the collection of sets Γ(β, δ) = {W ⊂ V : W ⊂ B(W | β, δ)}. By
definition, C(β, δ) ∈ Γ(β, δ). As the stage game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
by assumption, both C(β, δ) and Γ(β, δ) are non-empty. This collection of sets is
partially ordered by the relation ⊂. It is not difficult to see that any chain consisting
of elements of Γ(β, δ) has an upper bound. By Zorn’s Lemma, Γ(β, δ) has a maximal
element; call it W (β, δ). Following APS, one can prove that W (β, δ) = C(β, δ).

3.2

Strotz-Pollak Equilibrium and Subgame Perfection

In a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, each player’s strategy is a ‘consistent plan’ that takes
into account — on and off the equilibrium path — the present bias that the player’s
preferences exhibit. In other words, at each stage of the game, each player’s current
‘self’ finds it optimal to choose the actions specified by the strategy profile.
It is well known that in infinitely repeated games with observable actions and
geometric discounting, the sets of Strotz-Pollak equilibria and subgame perfect equilibria coincide, by the one-stage deviation principle; hence, these equilibrium payoff
sets coincide as well. We now analyze this ‘equivalence’ result when β < 1.
To this end, we call a strategy profile f a sincere Nash equilibrium of G∞ (β, δ)
if ui (f | β, δ) ≥ ui (gi , f−i | β, δ) for all gi : H → Ai and all i ∈ N , and a sincere
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) if f |h is a sincere Nash equilibrium of G∞ (β, δ)
for any history h ∈ H. The qualifier ‘sincere’ is added to emphasize that, in each
subgame, a player evaluates the optimality of his strategy in all stages using his
current preferences. This distinction is clearly immaterial if β = 1.
Notice that every sincere subgame perfect equilibrium is Strotz-Pollak, because
the latter only checks for one-stage deviations at the beginning of each subgame.
The following example shows that the converse is not true when β < 1. It also
illustrates how to use Theorem 1 to construct Strotz-Pollak equilibria.
Example 1: Strotz-Pollak Equilibrium Needn’t Be Subgame Perfect.
Consider an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game with β =
that ∆( 31 , 76 ) = 23 . The stage game is as follows:
L

R

U

1, 1

−1, 2

D

2, −1

0, 0

6

1
3

and δ = 67 , so

41 44
It is easy to show that the set W = {(0, 0), (1, 1), ( 49
, 49 ), ( 78 , 57 )} is self-generating

and hence belongs to C( 31 , 67 ). The vector (0, 0) can be supported by the action
profile (D, R) and the continuation vector (κ(U, L), κ(U, R), κ(D, L), κ(D, R)) =
((0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0)), which obviously constitutes an admissible pair. Likewise,
• (1, 1) can be supported by Nash reversion: ((U, L), ((1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0))
• ( 87 , 57 ) can then be supported by ((D, L), ((0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 1), (0, 0)))
• ( 41
, 44 ) can then be supported by ((U, R), ((1, 1), ( 78 , 75 ), (0, 0), (0, 0)))
49 49
In each case, it is straightforward to check that the pair suggested is admissible.
We shall use the set W of continuation payoffs to support the following StrotzPollak equilibrium path: (U, R), (U, R), (D, L), (U, L), (U, L), . . .. This path yields
the average discounted payoff vector u(f | 31 , 67 ) = ( 11
, 62 ) by the strategy profile f :
49 49
41 44
• Stage 0: the pair is ((U, R), ((0, 0), ( 49
, 49 ), (0, 0), (0, 0))),

• Stage 1: after h1 = {(U, R)}, the pair is ((U, R), ((1, 1), ( 87 , 57 ), (0, 0), (0, 0))),
• Stage 2: after {(U, R), (U, R)}, ((D, L), ((0, 0), (0, 0), (1, 1), (0, 0))),
• Stage 3: after {(U, R), (U, R), (D, L)}, ((U, L), ((1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0))) . . ..
For instance, if a player deviates from the action profile (U, R) at stage 0, and,
as a result, the stage-1 public history differs from {(U, R)}, the players would play
(D, R) forever thereafter. A similar interpretation applies to subsequent stages.
It is not difficult to verify that (i) u(f |{(U,R)} |

1 6
, )
3 7

= ( 37 , 87 ) and that (ii)

this strategy profile is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium. At stage 1, player 2 cannot
benefit from deviating to L ( 78 > 1) as he myopically attaches a relative weight

1
3

to

stage 1’s payoff. But notice that the relative weight he attaches at stage 0 to stage 1’s
continuation payoff equals 76 , not 32 . As a result, if player 2, given his preferences at
stage 0, plans to switch to L at stage 1, then his stage-0 expected payoff rises to 43 .
Thus, this strategy profile is not a sincere subgame perfect equilibrium. ¤
Inspired by this example, we now show that, unlike the single-agent case, we can
always support a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium path by a strategy profile that meets
the stronger requirement of sincere subgame perfection; in other words, there is no
conflict between current and future ‘selves’ of any one player.

7

We shall say that a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium f obeys the punishment property
if, for any player i ∈ N , history h ∈ H, and action ai ∈ Ai \{fi (h)}, we have
ci (f |h | δ) ≥ ci ((ai , f−i (h)), f |{h,(ai ,f−i (h))} | δ).
One normally thinks of deviations as securing immediate gain for later punishment.
In fact, the opposite might sustain incentive compatibility — trading future gain
against current losses. When this is not true, the punishment property obtains.
This property is violated in Example 1. Player 2’s continuation payoff in stage 1
is

5
7

if he plays R and 1 if he deviates and plays L. It is easy to check that if

we replace κ(U, L) = (1, 1) by (0, 0) in stage 1, then the resulting Strotz-Pollak
equilibrium obeys the punishment property and is sincere subgame perfect. Indeed,
Theorem 2 If f ∈ ΣSP (β, δ) has the punishment property, then it is a sincere SPE.
The proof is in the appendix, but the intuition is as follows. Everyone assigns
more relative weight to current than continuation payoffs — i.e., (1 − ∆(β, δ)) vs.
(1−δ) — than he did at any earlier stage. Thus, player i’s incentivee constraints are
met if δ replaces ∆(β, δ), given the punishment property. This eliminates one-shot
deviations planned at a ‘future stage’, as in Example 1. By induction, no one can
benefit by deviating in any finite number of stages, or infinitely often, by standard
reasoning. Thus, if there is never any temptation to defect this period, as in a
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium, then no one ever wishes to plan to defect in the future.
Despite the couched message of Theorem 2, we now assert that any Strotz-Pollak
equilibrium outcome path can be supported as a sincere subgame perfect one.
Corollary 1 Every Strotz-Pollak equilibrium path is also a sincere SPE path, and
therefore every Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoff vector is a sincere SPE vector.
Quite unlike the single-agent literature, we can therefore always structure StrotzPollak equilibria so that, given the other players’ strategies, no conflict arises between the different selves of a player about the optimality of his strategy.
The argument, in the appendix, is straightforward. By compactness of U (β, δ)
and C(β, δ), there exists a worst Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoff for each player.
As in Abreu (1988), any Strotz-Pollak equilibrium path can, without loss of generality, be supported by threatening to switch to a player’s worst such equilibrium
if he deviates. Since an optimal penal code gives a player the lowest equilibrium
continuation payoff if he deviates, it clearly satisfies the punishment property.
8

From the point of view of a player, the strategy profile of the other players defines
a Markov decision problem. Different actions today may lead to different paths,
and thus different payoffs, from tomorrow onward. Thus, given the other players’
strategies, a player solves a standard single agent Markov decision problem but with
β-δ preferences, which is subject to the usual time inconsistency issues: A player’s
optimal strategy need not coincide with the one that he would ‘commit’ to use in the
future. (This is exactly what Example 1 illustrates.) Since we can always support a
Strotz-Pollak equilibrium path by switching to the worst possible equilibrium payoff
for a deviant player, the Markov decision problem meets an additional ‘consistency’
property: In the SPE of the game with his future selves, there is no conflict between
current and future selves. This is a result of our paper, and it is due precisely to
the multi-player repeated game structure we analyze. This cannot be assumed
for a single agent problem, because in such a context, the ‘states’ and ‘transition
probabilities’ of the Markov decision problem are given rather than constructed
as in a repeated game setting. In other words, we link up the core penal code
characterization of Abreu with the reason why the adverse consequences of β-δ
preferences are ameliorated in a strategic setting.
The next caveat is instructive. If we posited future-biased preferences, with β > 1
(for which our model is still well-defined), then Theorem 2 would fail. A reverse of
the punishment property would be needed: Players who deviate should expect to
be rewarded in the future, and punished immediately. But there is no general way
of supporting subgame perfect equilibria failing the punishment property.

3.3

Public Randomization and Convex Payoff Sets

We now extend the results, adding a public randomization device to the stage game.
This extension critically convexifies the sets of equilibrium and continuation payoffs.
A public randomization device P is a machine that, at the outset of each stage,
randomly selects some p ∈ [0, 1] according to the uniform distribution and publicly
informs the players of the realization. In such games, stage k’s history hk ∈ H k
∞
includes all past actions and public signals. Let G∞
P (β, δ) denote the game G (β, δ)

extended by the public randomization device P. In G∞
P (β, δ), a stage-k strategy
for player i is a Borel map fi from H k × [0, 1] to Ai . Player i’s expected average

9

k
discounted payoff, conditional on any history h ∈ H = ∪∞
k=0 H , then obeys:

Z
uPi (f |h

1

| β, δ) =
0

[(1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (f (h, p)) + ∆(β, δ)cPi (f |{h,(f (h,p),p)} | δ)]dp,

where

Z
cPi (f |h

1

| δ) =
0

[(1 − δ)πi (f (h, p)) + δcPi (f |{h,(f (h,p),p)} | δ)]dp.

Strotz-Pollak equilibrium and sincere SPE easily extend to G∞
P (β, δ). Let UP (β, δ)
and CP (β, δ) be the sets of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium and continuation payoffs.
Fix ∆ ∈ (0, 1) and W ⊂ Rn . Let a(p) : [0, 1] → A be Borel measurable and
κ(a, p) : A × [0, 1] → W Borel measurable w.r.t. p for any a ∈ A. The pair (a, κ) is
called (∆, P )-admissible w.r.t. W if, for all a0i ∈ Ai \{ai (p)}, p ∈ [0, 1], and i ∈ N,
(1 − ∆)πi (ai (p)) + ∆κ(ai (p), p) ≥ (1 − ∆)πi (a0i , a−i (p)) + ∆κ((a0i , a−i (p)), p).
For any compact set W ⊂ Rn , the set BP (W | β, δ) is defined by2
Z

1

n

BP (W | β, δ) = {v ∈ R : v =

[(1 − δ)π(a(p)) + δκ(a(p), p)]dp
0

and (a, κ) is (∆(β, δ), P )-admissible w.r.t. W }.
A set W ⊂ V is now self-generating if W ⊂ BP (W | β, δ). We next extend the
self-generation and factorization properties of Theorem 1:
Theorem 3 Fix β, δ ∈ (0, 1).
(a) If W ⊂ Rn is self-generating, then BP (W | β, δ) ⊂ CP (β, δ).
(b) Factorization: CP (β, δ) is the largest fixed point of the operator BP (· | β, δ) :
Z

1

n

CP (β, δ) = {v ∈ R : v =

[(1 − δ)π(a(p)) + δκ(a(p), p)]dp
0

and (a, κ) is (∆(β, δ), P )-admissible w.r.t. CP (β, δ)}.
2

Since the set A is finite, κ : A × [0, 1] → W is a Caratheodory function; therefore,
κ(a(p), p) : [0, 1] → W is Borel measurable for any Borel measurable a(p) : [0, 1] → A (see
Aubin and Frankowska, 1990, for example). Thus, the integral is well-defined.
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Furthermore, UP (β, δ) ⊂ Rn satisfies:
Z

1

n

UP (β, δ) = {v ∈ R : v =

[(1 − ∆(β, δ))π(a(p)) + ∆(β, δ)κ(a(p), p)]dp
0

and (a, κ) is (∆(β, δ), P )-admissible w.r.t. CP (β, δ)}.
(c) The sets CP (β, δ) and UP (β, δ) are convex and compact.
To see the convexity assertion, note that for any compact set W ⊂ Rn , any β ∈ (0, 1],
and δ ∈ (0, 1),
BP (W | β, δ) = co B(W | β, δ).
Since the convex hull of a compact set is compact, the proof of the compactness of
CP (β, δ) is similar to that of Theorem 4 in APS.
The logic underlying Corollary 1 extends here as well:
Corollary 2 For any β, δ ∈ (0, 1), every Strotz-Pollak equilibrium payoff vector of
G∞
P (β, δ) can be attained in a sincere SPE.
When β = 1, we have CP (1, δ) = UP (1, δ). A crucial difference, and the source
of much novelty here, is that CP (β, δ) is often a proper subset of UP (β, δ) if β < 1.
Theorem 4 For any β, δ ∈ (0, 1), CP (β, δ) ⊂ UP (β, δ).
Example 2 illustrates strict inclusion.
For a puzzling counter-intuition, observe that equilibrium payoffs in UP (β, δ)
place a lower weight on continuation payoffs than do payoffs in the set CP (β, δ),
because ∆(β, δ) < δ. As a result, the APS monotonicity proof method fails, since it
fixes the strategy played in the current stage game, and adjusts continuation payoffs.
Any direct proof must be far more subtle, and we have found none. Our indirect
proof owes to the following central lemma, with an argument by separation.
Lemma 1 Let β1 < β2 and δ1 > δ2 satisfy ∆(β1 , δ1 ) = ∆(β2 , δ2 ). Assume that
W ⊂ BP (W | β1 , δ1 ) ⊂ Rn is compact. Then BP (W | β1 , δ1 ) ⊂ BP (W | β2 , δ2 ).
Proof of Theorem 4: In Lemma 1, set β1 = β, δ1 = δ, δ2 = ∆(β, δ) < δ1 , β2 = 1, and
choose W = CP (β, δ). Observe that with this choice, ∆(β1 , δ1 ) = ∆(β2 , δ2 ) = ∆,
say. Since CP (β, δ) = BP (CP (β, δ)|β, δ) and UP (β, δ) = BP (CP (β, δ)|1, ∆), by
Theorem 3 (b), Lemma 1 yields the desired inclusion CP (β, δ) ⊂ UP (β, δ).
11
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Proof of Lemma 1: By contradiction, assume there exists x1 ∈ BP (W | β1 , δ1 ) \
BP (W | β2 , δ2 ). Since both sets are convex, by the Separating Hyperplane Theorem,
there exists γ ∈ Rn and ε > 0 with hγ, x1 i ≥ hγ, x2 i + ε for all x2 ∈ BP (W | β2 , δ2 ).
Since BP (W | β1 , δ1 ) is compact, let x̄1 maximize hγ, ci over c ∈ BP (W |β1 , δ1 ).
Put ∆ = ∆(β1 , δ1 ) = ∆(β2 , δ2 ). Then for some pair (a, κ) (∆, P )-admissible w.r.t. W ,
Z

1

x̄1 =

[(1 − δ1 )π(a(p)) + δ1 κ(a(p), p)]dp ≡ (1 − δ1 )Π + δ1 K,
0

thus defining Π and K. Setting x̄2 = (1 − δ2 )Π + δ2 K, we have x̄2 ∈ BP (W | β2 , δ2 ).
Therefore, using the definitions of x̄1 , x1 , and x̄2 , we have the chain of inequalities:
hγ, (1 − δ1 )Π + δ1 Ki = hγ, x̄1 i ≥ hγ, x1 i ≥ hγ, x̄2 i + ε = hγ, (1 − δ2 )Π + δ2 Ki + ε
Since δ2 < δ1 , comparing the two weighted averages yields hγ, Ki > hγ, x̄1 i. This
R1
contradicts the definition of x̄1 , since K = 0 κ(a(p), p)dp ∈ W ⊂ BP (W |β1 , δ1 ). ¤

4

The Cost of the Present-Time Bias

4.1

Monotonicity of the Equilibrium Payoff Set?

In the comparative static result in APS, the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs expands in the discount factor δ. This result accords well with intuition,
as it is natural to surmise that players should be able to support more equilibrium
outcomes as they grow more patient and thereby weigh future payoffs more heavily.
The recursive techniques of APS afford a simple yet elegant proof of this.
We now revisit this issue when β < 1. Unlike APS, more than one comparative
static exercise is possible here. We explore how the set of Strotz-Pollak equilibrium
payoffs changes when either or both of β or δ change. The analysis is more difficult
than with geometric discounting, largely because of Theorem 4. As we show below,
changes in either β or δ (or both) differentially affect each of the two sets CP (β, δ)
and UP (β, δ), which wrecks havoc on the APS monotonicity intuition.
A. Compensated β-δ Changes. We first look at the relative importance of
β and δ by studying games G∞
P (β, δ) with identical incentive constraints, holding
∆(β, δ) fixed. The following result reveals an interesting trade-off between the two.
In words, an increase in β accompanied by a ∆-compensating decrease in δ, yields
12

more equilibrium payoffs. Just the same, an “inverse” monotonicity in δ obtains:
An increase in δ holding ∆(β, δ) fixed expands the range of equilibrium payoffs.
Proposition 1 Let β1 , δ1 , δ2 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 ∈ (0, 1]. Holding fixed the effective
discount factor ∆(β1 , δ1 ) = ∆(β2 , δ2 ), if β1 < β2 , then UP (β1 , δ1 ) ⊂ UP (β2 , δ2 ).
Proof : Let W ⊂ V be compact with W ⊂ BP (W | β1 , δ1 ).

By Lemma 1,

W ⊂ BP (W | β1 , δ1 ) ⊂ BP (W | β2 , δ2 ). So if W = CP (β1 , δ1 ), then CP (β1 , δ1 ) ⊂
BP (CP (β1 , δ1 ) | β2 , δ2 ). Therefore, CP (β1 , δ1 ) ⊂ CP (β2 , δ2 ) by Theorem 3 (b).
Finally, let ∆ = ∆(β1 , δ1 ) = ∆(β2 , δ2 ).

Anything (∆, P ) admissible w.r.t.

CP (β1 , δ1 ) is (∆, P ) admissible w.r.t. CP (β2 , δ2 ). So UP (β1 , δ1 ) ⊂ UP (β2 , δ2 ).

¤

B. Uncompensated β-δ Changes. We now turn to comparative static analyses
with respect to β or δ. The following result is a useful consequence of Proposition 1:
Monotonicity in δ implies monotonicity in β.
Corollary 3 If UP (β, δ1 ) ⊂ UP (β, δ2 ) for any β, δ1 , δ2 ∈ (0, 1) with δ1 < δ2 , then
UP (β1 , δ) ⊂ UP (β2 , δ) for any δ ∈ (0, 1) and β1 , β2 ∈ (0, 1], with β1 < β2 .
Proof: Let β1 < β2 ≤ 1 and choose δ 0 < δ with ∆(β1 , δ) = ∆(β2 , δ 0 ). Then
UP (β1 , δ) ⊂ UP (β2 , δ 0 ) by Proposition 1, and UP (β2 , δ 0 ) ⊂ UP (β2 , δ), since δ 0 < δ. ¤
Following APS, one might expect that the set of equilibrium payoffs weakly
expands in δ. Surprisingly, this well-known result from standard repeated games fails
when β < 1. Indeed, the following example shows that UP (β, δ) is not monotonic
in β; by the contrapositive of Corollary 3, it is not monotonic in δ either.
Example 2: Non-Monotonicity in Either Discount Factor.
L

M

R

U

1, −1 −1, 0

−1, 0

M

−1, 0

1, −1

D

−1, 0 −1, 0

1, 1

2
1, 11

It is clear that the pure strategy minimax point of this game is (1, 0). Therefore,
the line segment [(1, 0), (1, 1)] in R2 contains both UP (β, δ) and CP (β, δ). Since
2
(D, R) and (M, M ) are Nash equilibria of the stage game, the payoff vectors (1, 11
)

and (1, 1) belong to CP (β, δ) ∩ UP (β, δ), for all β, δ ∈ (0, 1).
Let δ =

7
10

and β1 =

11
;
21

hence, ∆(β1 , δ) =
13

11
.
20

We first show that, Player 2’s worst Strotz-Pollak equilibrium continuation pay2
2
off vector is (1, 11
). Let Y = [(1, 0), (1, 11
)). By contradiction, assume that Y ∩
11 7
CP ( 21
, 10 ) 6= ∅. For this to be possible, there must exist a continuation payoff

vector κ = (κ1 , κ2 ) ∈ Y supported by an action profile with the stage-game payoff vector (1, −1). But this can be dismissed on incentive compatibility grounds
for player 2. So, without loss of generality, we can assume that any deviation by
2
).
player 2 is punished by the continuation payoff vector (1, 11

It is not difficult to see that the action profile (U, L) and the continuation value
2
) for all (a1 , a2 ) 6= (U, L) is
function κ with κ(U, L) = (1, 1) and κ(a1 , a2 ) = (1, 11
1
∆(β1 , δ)-admissible, with the corresponding equilibrium payoff vector (1, 10
). The

admissibility of this pair is simple: if player 2 deviates to M or R, his expected
payoff equals

1
.
10

1
Therefore, (1, 10
) ∈ UP ( 11
, 7 ). Also, it is easy to show that
21 10

the lowest equilibrium payoff for player 2, so that

UP ( 11
, 7)
21 10

= [(1,

1
10

is

1
), (1, 1)].
10

For an illustration of Theorem 4, observe how
µ
CP

11 7
,
21 10

Let β2 =

12
.
21

¶

·µ
=

2
1,
11

¶

¸
¶ ·µ
¶
¸
µ
11 7
1
, (1, 1) ( UP
,
=
1,
, (1, 1)
21 10
10

1
The following argument shows that (1, 10
)∈
/ UP (β2 , δ2 ).

• Observe that ∆(β2 , δ) =

4
7

12 7
and that CP ( 11
, 7 ) = CP ( 21
, 10 ). Thus, the worst
21 10

continuation payoff for player 2 is the same as before.
• Any pair (a, κ) that delivers

1
10

to player 2 uses the action profile (U, L) and

thus is not ∆(β2 , δ)-admissible: player 2 earns

8
77

by deviating from (U, L).

8
) can be supported by the action profile (U, L) and
• The payoff vector (1, 77
2
continuation payoffs κ(U, L) = (1, 41
), κ(a1 , a2 ) = (1, 11
) for all a 6= (U, L).
44

• It is easy to see that
12 7
UP ( 21
, 10 )

= [(1,

8
77

is the lowest equilibrium payoff for player 2. Thus,

8
), (1, 1)]
77

1
and (1, 10
)∈
/ UP (β2 , δ2 ).

8
11 7
1
Since UP ( 12
, 7 ) = [(1, 77
), (1, 1)] is a proper subset of UP ( 21
, 10 ) = [(1, 10
), (1, 1)],
21 10

the equilibrium payoff set shrinks in β — and so does not expand in δ either.

¤

The key to understanding the example is found in Theorem 4: Unlike with
geometric discounting, the worst possible continuation payoff for a player need not
coincide with the worst possible equilibrium payoff. Since (i) the increase in β does
not affect the worst possible continuation payoff for player 2 in the example, and
(ii) the worst possible equilibrium payoff for him must be supported in both cases
14

by playing (U, L) in the current period (payoff −1), it easily follows that the worst
possible equilibrium payoff must increase in this case.
Based on these considerations, a natural conjecture to explore is whether the
monotonicity property holds when the worst possible equilibrium and continuation
payoffs coincide. That CP (β, δ) is actually monotone in β and in δ reinforces the
plausibility of this conjecture — a result we show in the Appendix (see Claim 2).
An oft-studied class of games in which the worst possible equilibrium and continuation payoffs coincide are those where the minimax point is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium payoff of the stage game. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is one such example.
With this extra assumption, the equilibrium payoff set is indeed monotone.
Proposition 2 Let the minimax point of G be a pure strategy Nash outcome of G.
(a) Let β, δ1 , δ2 ∈ (0, 1) and δ1 < δ2 . Then UP (β, δ1 ) ⊂ UP (β, δ2 ).
(b) Let β1 , β2 , δ ∈ (0, 1) and β1 < β2 . Then UP (β1 , δ) ⊂ UP (β2 , δ).
The proof of part (a) is found in the Appendix. Corollary 3 then yields part (b).
Another natural conjecture is that, while separate monotonicity in β and δ fails,
the set of equilibrium payoffs is monotonic in the effective discount factor ∆(β, δ).
As we shall see below in Example 3, no such result obtains.

4.2

Bounds on the Equilibrium Payoff Set

We now turn to the analysis of the following question: Given β and δ, can we bound
UP (β, δ) by sets of equilibrium payoffs of games with geometric discount factors?
This inquiry is important. First, it offers a different perspective on how severe is
the failure of the monotonicity property, since geometric discounting is the natural
benchmark. Does the payoff set collapses with β < 1? Second, it addresses how
persistent is the present bias cost at high discount factors: Can we deduce the
folk-theorem for β-δ preferences from the standard one with geometric discounting?
A. Fixed β, δ < 1. Setting β2 = 1 in Proposition 1 yields an easy upper bound.
Proposition 3 (Upper Bound) For any β, δ ∈ (0, 1), UP (β, δ) ⊂ UP (1, ∆(β, δ)).
How much does the set of equilibrium payoffs shrink with greater myopia (lower β)?
Perhaps the monotonicity failure is not that strong. Observe that βδ is the largest
discount factor that uniformly discounts payoffs by less than the β-δ decision maker:
(1, βδ, (βδ)2 , (βδ)3 , . . .) ≤ (1, βδ, βδ 2 , βδ 3 , . . .)
15

Is UP (1, βδ) then a lower bound on UP (β, δ)? We can show that the answer is yes in
any symmetric prisoner’s dilemma game (omitted example). But despite its intuitive
appeal, the conjecture is generally wrong: Besides disproving the conjecture, the
example also reveals that a slightly smaller β cannot always be offset by greater δ.
This shows that the search for a lower bound set may prove a daunting task.
Example 3: Payoff Lower bound: UP (β, δ) need not contain UP (1, βδ).
Let the stage game be:
L

R

U

1, −1

−1, 0

D

1, 1

0, 1

The minimax point of this stage game is (0, 0). Let us show that the set W =
{(1, 0), (1, 1), (0, 0)} is self-generating if β = 1 and δ = 12 .
• The payoff vector (1, 0) is supported by the action profile (U, L) and continuation values (κ(U, L), κ(U, R), κ(D, L), κ(D, R)) = ((1, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0)).
• The payoff vector (0, 0) is supported by the action profile (U, R) and the continuation values ((0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 0), (0, 0)).
• The payoff vector (1, 1) is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the stage game.
Since W is self-generating, we have W ⊂ U (1, 12 ), and, in particular, (0, 0) ∈ U (1, 12 ).
We claim that (0, 0) ∈
/ U (β, δ) for any β, δ ∈ (0, 1).3 By contradiction, assume
that (0, 0) ∈ U (β, δ) for some β, δ ∈ (0, 1). Because any continuation payoff vector
lies in the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs, (U, R) is the only action
profile that can be used to support the payoff vector (0, 0), with the corresponding
continuation payoff vector κ(U, R) belonging to the half-open interval ((0, 0), (1, 0)].
Denote x∗ = max{x ≥ 0 : (x, 0) ∈ C(β, δ)}, by compactness of C(β, δ). The
continuation payoff vector κ∗ = (x∗ , 0) can be supported only by a pair with the
action profile (U, L). Let us show that the incentive constraints cannot hold for any
such pair. Assume, by contradiction, that (x∗ , 0) can be supported by some pair
((U, L), κ0 ). Then
0 = (1 − δ)(−1) + δκ02 (U, L),
and the corresponding incentive constraint for player 2 is
(1 − ∆(β, δ))(−1) + ∆(β, δ)κ02 (U, L) ≥ ∆(β, δ)κ02 (U, R).
3

Clearly, this claim is also valid if a public randomization device is added to the game.
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Since κ02 (U, R) ≥ 0, we have
(1 − ∆(β, δ))(−1) + ∆(β, δ)κ02 (U, L) ≥ 0,
which contradicts ∆(β, δ) < δ. Thus, (0, 0) ∈
/ U (β, δ) for any β, δ ∈ (0, 1). In
particular, this holds for any β and δ with βδ = 21 . Hence, UP (1, 12 ) * UP (β, δ). ¤
B. Large β, δ ↑ 1. In the example, present-time bias so corrupted the equilibrium
payoff set that no increase in the long-term discount factor δ can atone for the
damage.4 We now show more strongly that this precludes a lower bound that yields
by corollary a folk-theorem for the β-δ case from the standard one. The argument is
as follows. First, UP (1, 12 ) * UP (β, δ) for all β, δ ∈ (0, 1). Since UP (1, δ) is monotonic
in δ and (0, 0) ∈ UP (1, 21 ), we have UP (1, δ 0 ) * UP (β, δ) for all β, δ ∈ (0, 1) and all
δ 0 ∈ ( 21 , 1). Thus, there does not exist a function ψ(β, δ) such that lim ψ(β, δ) = 1
β,δ→1

and UP (1, ψ(β, δ)) ⊂ UP (β, δ) for all β, δ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, that UP (1, ψ) ↑ V as ψ ↑ 1
cannot be used to deduce UP (β, δ) ↑ V as β, δ → 1. Further research beckons.

5

CONCLUSION

Micro inconsistency is generally thought to be an important phenomenon, and worthy of study. The standard context for this has been a variety of decision theory
exercises with a state variable, such as arises in an addiction or consumption context. We have shifted this discussion to a wholly new framework, asking whether
there are any economically important and novel implications for repeated games.
We have developed a usable framework for exploring such games with β-δ preferences, that critically exploits the Abreu (1988) optimal penal code characterization.
One may wonder whether the repeated game can offer any interesting and surprising implications for beta-delta preferences, even though the corresponding decision
theory problem does not. With our tools, we feel that the answer is undeniably
‘yes’: We prove that the most basic comparative static of repeated games literature
— monotonicity in the discount factor — disappears.5 In its place, we deduce a
compensated comparative static that only admits an indirect proof. We have also
provided insights into the delicate nature of the β-δ folk theorem.
4
The reader may wonder whether UP (1, βδ) ⊂ UP (β, δ) when the minimax point of the stage
game is a pure strategy Nash payoff vector. We omit an example that disproves this conjecture.
5
This result only fails in contexts without public randomization.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs

A.1

Punishment Property / SPE: Proof of Theorem 2
k

Assume, by contradiction, there exists a history hk ∈ H such that f |h is not a sincere
Nash equilibrium of G∞ (β, δ). Without loss of generality, hk = h0 . Then there exist
player i and strategy gi : H → Ai such that ui (gi , f−i | β, δ)) > ui (f | β, δ). For any
K ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, define the following function giK : H → Ai ,

giK (h) =



 gi (h)

for all h ∈ ∪ H j ,


 fi (h)

for all h ∈

K

j=0
∞

∪ Hj

j=K+1

Since the players’ future payoffs are discounted, there exists K ∈ {1, . . .} such that
ui (giK , f−i | β, δ) > ui (f | β, δ). Let hg = {a0 , a1 , . . . , aK , . . .} denote the path of
action profiles generated by the strategy profile (giK , f−i ), and hkg = {a0 , . . . , ak−1 },
K

k ∈ {1, . . .}. Player i’s stage-K average discounted payoff ui ((giK , f−i )|hg | β, δ) can
be represented as follows:
K+1

K
|hg
(1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (giK (hK
g ), f−i (hg ))) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f

| δ)

Since the strategy profile f is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium of G(β, δ), the strategy
profile f (hK
g ) is a Nash equilibrium of the following reduced normal form game
K

(N, (Ai )i∈N , ((1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (·) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f |{hg ,·} | δ))i∈N ). Therefore,
K

K

|{hg ,f (hg )}
(1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (f (hK
| δ)
g )) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f
K+1

K
|hg
≥ (1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (giK (hK
g ), f−i (hg )) + ∆(β, δ)ci (f
K

| δ).

K

|{hg ,f (hg )}
K
Assume that giK (hK
| δ) ≥
g ) 6= fi (hg ). Because ∆(β, δ) < δ, and since ci (f
K+1

ci (f |hg

| δ) by the punishment property, we conclude that
K

K+1

K

|{hg ,f (hg )}
K
|hg
(1−δ)πi (f (hK
| δ) ≥ (1−δ)πi (giK (hK
g ))+δci (f
g ), f−i (hg ))+δci (f

| δ).

Therefore, player i optimizes his stage-0 expected payoff by employing the strategy
K
K
fi (hK
g ) instead of gi (hg ) at stage K. That is,

ui (giK−1 , f−i | β, δ) ≥ ui (giK , f−i | β, δ).
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Proceeding similarly, we get the following chain of inequalities ui (f | β, δ) ≥
ui (gi0 , f−i | β, δ) ≥ . . . ≥ ui (giK , f−i | β, δ). This is a contradiction.

A.2

¤

Strotz-Pollak and Sincere SPE: Proof of Corollary 1

Preamble. Let Q(f ) denote the infinite sequence of action profiles (the path) that
results from conformity with the strategy profile f = (f1 , . . . , fn ) in the absence
of deviations, and let Ω = A∞ denote the set of paths. For each Q ∈ Ω, let
k
∞
Q = {ak (Q)}∞
k=0 , where {a (Q)}k=0 is the corresponding sequence of action profiles.

Let Qi ∈ Ω, i = 0, 1, . . . , n. Following Abreu (1988), let σ(Q0 , Q1 , . . . , Qn ) denote
the corresponding simple strategy profile. Here Q0 is the initial path and Qi is the
punishment path for any deviation by player i after any history. Define continuation
payoffs from path Q starting at stage k to be:
∞
X
κi (Q, k) = (1 − δ) δ s πi (ak+s (Q)).
s=0

Claim 1 A simple strategy profile σ(Q0 , Q1 , . . . , Qn ) is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium
if and only if
(1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (ak (Qj )) + ∆(β, δ)κi (Qj , k + 1))
≥ (1 − ∆(β, δ))πi (a0i , ak−i (Qj )) + ∆(β, δ)κi (Qi , k + 1))
for all a0i ∈ Ai \aki (Qj ), all i ∈ N , all j ∈ {0} ∪ N , and all k = 0, 1, . . ..
This claim follows directly from the definition of a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium.
An optimal penal code for G∞ (β, δ) is an n-vector of pure strategy profiles
(f1 , f2 , . . . , fn ), where fi ∈ ΣSP (β, δ) delivers the worst possible punishment for
player i:
ci (fi | δ) = vi (β, δ) = min vi .
v∈C(β,δ)

Existence of an optimal penal code in G∞ (β, δ) owes to compactness of C(β, δ).
Using Abreu’s notation, Corollary 1 can be reformulated: If f ∈ ΣSP (β, δ) and
(f1 , . . . , fn ) is an optimal penal code, then σ = σ(Q(f ), Q(f1 ), . . . , Q(fn )) is a sincere
subgame perfect equilibrium.
The Proof. Obviously, the strategy profile σ = σ(Q(f ), Q(f1 ), . . . , Q(fn )) has
the punishment property. It is a Strotz-Pollak equilibrium by Claim 1 and, therefore,
19

is a sincere subgame perfect equilibrium by Theorem 2.

A.3

¤

Uncompensated Comparative Statics

Continuation Payoffs. The proof makes use of the following result:
Claim 2 (a) If β, δ1 , δ2 ∈ (0, 1) and δ1 < δ2 , then CP (β, δ1 ) ⊂ CP (β, δ2 ).
(b) If β1 , δ ∈ (0, 1), β2 ∈ (0, 1], and β1 < β2 , then CP (β1 , δ) ⊂ CP (β2 , δ).
Proof of Claim: Let W ⊂ Rn be compact with W ⊂ BP (W | β, δ1 ). We
first show that W ⊂ BP (BP (W | β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ). Let x ∈ W be arbitrary. Since
x ∈ BP (W | β, δ1 ), there exists a pair (a, κ0 ) (∆(β, δ1 ), P )-admissible w.r.t. W such
that

Z

1

x=

[(1 − δ1 )π(a(p)) + δ1 κ0 (a(p), p)]dp.

0

For all p ∈ [0, 1], we have
w(p) = (1 − δ1 )π(a(p)) + δ1 κ0 (a(p), p) ∈ B(W | β, δ1 ).
Let us show that w(p) ∈ B(B(W | β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Fix λ =

δ1 (1−δ2 )
δ2 (1−δ1 )

and p ∈ [0, 1]. Define the continuation value function κ1 : A × [0, 1] → B(W | β, δ1 )
κ1 (a, p) = (1 − λ)w(p) + λκ0 (a, p).
It is clear that w(p) = (1 − δ2 )π(a(p)) + δ2 κ1 (a(p), p). We need to verify that
(1 − δ2 )π(a(p)) + βδ2 κ1 (a(p), p) ≥ (1 − δ2 )π(ai , a−i (p)) + βδ2 κ1 ((ai , a−i (p)), p)
for all ai ∈ Ai \{ai (p)} and all i ∈ N . It is not difficult to see that the incentive
constraints hold since, for all a ∈ A and all p ∈ [0, 1],
(1−δ2 )π(a)+βδ2 κ1 (a, p) =

(1 − δ2 )
β(δ2 − δ1 )
[(1−δ1 )π(a)+βδ1 κ0 (a, p)]+
w(p).
(1 − δ1 )
1 − δ1

Since B(B(W | β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ) ⊂ BP (BP (W | β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ), we have w(p) ∈
R1
BP (BP (W | β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ) and, thus, x = 0 w(p)dp ∈ BP (BP (W | β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ).
In the particular case when W = CP (β, δ1 ), any point of CP (β, δ1 ) belongs to
BP (CP (β, δ1 ) | β, δ2 ) since BP (CP (β, δ1 ) | β, δ1 ) = CP (β, δ1 ). Invoking the maximal
property of CP (β, δ2 ), we conclude that CP (β, δ1 ) ⊂ CP (β, δ2 ).
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The second part of the statement follows from Corollary 3.

¤

Proof of Proposition 2. It is obvious that ∆(β, δ1 ) < ∆(β, δ2 ). If x ∈ UP (β, δ1 ),
then there exists a pair (a, κ0 ) (∆(β, δ1 ), P )-admissible w.r.t. CP (β1 , δ) such that
Z

1

x=

[(1 − ∆(β, δ1 ))π(a(p)) + ∆(β, δ1 )κ0 (a(p), p)]dp.

0

WLOG, κ0i ((ai , a−i (p)), p) =

min

(ei , w) = vi∗ for all ai ∈ Ai \{ai (p)}, all p ∈

w∈CP (β,δ1 )

[0, 1], and all i ∈ N . Note that even though, for each p ∈ [0, 1],
w(p) = (1 − ∆(β, δ1 ))π(a(p)) + ∆(β, δ1 )κ0 (a(p), p)
belongs to UP (β, δ1 ), w(p) need not belong to CP (β, δ1 ), which is the case if β = 1.
We must show that w(p) ∈ UP (β, δ2 ) for all p ∈ [0, 1]. Fix the constant λ =
∆(β, δ1 )(1 − ∆(β, δ2 )/(∆(β, δ2 )(1 − ∆(β, δ1 ))) =
(
κ1 (a, p) =

δ1 (1−δ2 )
δ2 (1−δ1 )

and p ∈ [0, 1]. Define

v ∗ if a = (ai , a−i (p)) and ai ∈ Ai \{ai (p)} for some i ∈ N,
(1 − λ)w(p) + λκ0 (a, p) otherwise.

It is not difficult to see that
w(p) = (1 − ∆(β, δ2 ))π(a(p)) + ∆(β, δ2 )κ1 (a(p), p).
First, let us verify that
wi (p) ≥ (1 − ∆(β, δ2 ))πi (ai , a−i (p)) + ∆(β, δ2 )vi∗
for all ai ∈ Ai \{ai (p)} and all i ∈ N . By contradiction, assume that there exist
i ∈ N and a0i ∈ Ai \{ai (p)} such that wi (p) < (1−∆(β, δ2 ))πi (a0i , a−i (p))+∆(β, δ2 )vi∗ .
Since wi (p) ≥ (1 − ∆(β, δ1 ))πi (ai , a−i (p)) + ∆(β, δ1 )vi∗ for all ai ∈ Ai , we have
κi (a(p), p) > vi∗ > πi (a0i , a−i (p)) > πi (a(p)).
Then πi (ai , a−i (p)) < vi∗ for all ai ∈ Ai , versus the definition of a minimax point.
To finish the proof, we only need to show that κ1 (a(p), p) ∈ CP (β, δ2 ). Since
L = [(1 − δ2 )π(a(p)) + δ2 κ0 (a(p), p), κ0 (a(p), p))] ⊂ CP (β, δ1 ),
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L ⊂ CP (β, δ2 ) by the lemma.
Let κ1 (a(p), p) ∈
/ L. It is then obvious that κ2 (a(p), p) such that κ1 (a(p), p) =
(1−δ2 )π(a(p))+δ2 κ2 (a(p), p)) belongs to [κ1 (a(p), p), κ0 (a(p), p))]. Let us show that
(1−∆(β, δ2 ))π(a(p))+∆(β, δ2 )κ2 (a(p), p)) ≥ (1−∆(β, δ2 ))π(ai , a−i (p))+∆(β, δ2 )vi∗
for all ai ∈ Ai \{ai (p)} and all i ∈ N . This is the case since
(1−∆(β, δ2 ))π(a(p))+∆(β, δ2 )κ2 (a(p), p)) =

δ2 − ∆(β, δ2 )
∆(β, δ2 ) 1
π(a(p))+
κ (a(p), p))
δ2
δ2

and ∆(β, δ2 )/δ 2 > ∆(β, δ2 ). If κ2 (a(p), p) ∈ L, the result follows. Otherwise,
consider κ3 (a(p), p) with κ2 (a(p), p) = (1 − δ2 )π(a(p)) + δ2 κ3 (a(p), p)). Proceeding
similarly, it is not hard to see that there exists l ∈ {2, . . .} such that κl (a(p), p)) ∈ L,
which completes the proof, since κ1 (a(p), p)) ∈ CP (β, δ2 ) by self-generation.

22
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